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Abstract
 
This paper considers a number of problems which arose after the publication of my
 
earlier work entitled Field of Spears. I will discuss how I sought clarity in the murky waters
 
of war memories,and consider instances in which I encountered inconsistent evidence and
 
difficult decisions about how much to report of the sometimes tragic or shameful actions of
 
informants during the stressful conditions of war. The manner in which I dealt with these
 
issues will also be discussed. I will also consider how the problems facing oral history
 
researchers do not end with the fieldwork process, but may begin in earnest after the
 
publication of their results. I close with an account of how positive experiences can help to
 
heal the scars of earlier trauma.
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Introduction
 
On the night of July 19/20,1945,a B-29 crew under the command of Captain Gordon
“Porky”Jordan was shot down during a routine mining mission to the harbor of Niigata City
 
in Northwest Honshu on the Inland Sea. Most of the crewmen bailed out over the countryside
 
on the outskirts and touched down in darkness,where each awaited his turn to face air raid
 
wardens, soldiers from anti-aircraft battalions, local defense groups and spear-wielding
 
civilians. Jordan’s crew had manned a lead bomber at the forefront of the Allied air
 
campaign,which had turned sixty-four major Japanese cities to ashes. Wartime propaganda
 
and grief for the loss of family members among turned to fierce anger as the remains of
 
Jordan’s bomber burned in an open field. In a drama that was replayed elsewhere throughout
 
Japan,a race was on between the Japanese military and civilians for who would find the
 
crewmen first. In the aftermath,four crewmen were confirmed dead. The surviving seven
 
were imprisoned,tortured and repatriated after the war. Many of the Japanese villagers and
 
military personnel were left to deal with their own painful memories of their participation in
 
the capture of the Jordan Crew.
This incident is the focus of Field of Spears (Paulownia Press 2007)which reconstructs
 
what happened on that July evening in 1945. The book is presented in narrative form and
 
draws heavily from oral interviews of both Japanese eyewitnesses and surviving B-29
 
crewmen. These interviews were cross-referenced to declassified military documents,
wartime letters,diaries,and photos taken by Japanese during the time of the crew’s capture.
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Field of Spears explores the disturbing transformations that ordinary people may undergo in
 
times of war, seeks to solve the mystery surrounding the deaths of several crewmen,and
 
considers the manner in which people try to deal with the remorse of later years,when war
 
memories become a source of silent suffering.
Research for this book took over three years as I worked to gain the trust of eyewitnesses
 
in small Japanese farming villages on the outskirts of Niigata City, the gatekeepers of
 
rarely-accessed archives in Niigata City and the former city of Yokogoshi,and the survivors
 
of the B-29 crew living quietly in rural American towns. All were initially suspicious of my
 
attempts to make contact. In the end,however,both Japanese villagers and B-29 crewmen
 
were united in the common desire to be heard,to be remembered,and to be understood. Many
 
had stayed silent about their recollections for over half a century,but as they reached the
 
sunset of their long lives,they wanted to lay down the burden of those days― to get it out
 
of their bodies,so to speak― and to communicate their pain to someone who would listen
 
sympathetically.
However,as I began to investigate beneath the surface of the accounts,I began to learn
 
that even as virtually all of the informants had something valuable to share, many had
 
something dreadful to hide. How they sought to relate their experiences often depended upon
 
the place they chose to tell the story as well as the quiet presence of others who accompanied
 
informants as a support community. In later opportunities when I had the chance to speak
 
with some informants privately,the accounts would often contain important details that had
 
been omitted or framed quite differently during earlier interviews.This experience highlighted
 
for me what I call“the plasticity of war memories”.
Figure 1:Japanese Photo of Jordan Crew Survivors Being Transported to Niigata for their
 
First Round of Interrogations (Courtesy of George McGraw/Valery Burati)
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 This view is based on current scientific research that suggests memories are encoded by
 
proteins in the brain. These proteins are broken down and resynthesized each time the
 
memory is accessed. People literally“re-member”each time they bring memories to con-
scious thought. Each and every time,the process of remembering is a renewed experience
 
connected to the past and relived in the present. However,memories are also slightly altered
 
each time they are resynthesized. Memories are broken down in this altered form, and
 
undergo slight changes each time they are accessed. Constant interaction with others who
 
have had similar experiences can also create false memories,especially when strong emotions
 
affect parts of the brain such as the amygdala.?
Understanding and deconstructing this“human element”is a regular issue for many oral
 
historians,but some committed to a more positivist view would contend that current research
 
on the plasticity of memory explains why testifiers change the historical record so that the
 
story becomes increasingly about them and less about what may or may not have happened.
Essentially,they can’t help themselves. Because of this,oral history studies are seen as rather
 
fraught. This point must be given serious consideration:because informants, especially
 
elderly ones,will have memories which have been altered over years of re-sequencing,and
 
may have acquired false memories about their actions during wartime. Some may have
 
simply forgotten key details. Given these facts,do oral history works such as Field of Spears
 
have any value?
This paper considers a number of issues related to this question,many of which have
 
arisen after the publication of Field of Spears. I will discuss how I sought clarity in the
 
murky waters of war memories. I consider instances in which I encountered inconsistent
 
evidence,instances in which aspects of the written record appeared questionable,and inci-
dents in which I suspected that testifiers were either not telling the truth,or were attempting
 
to sanitize their stories. The manner in which I dealt with these issues will also be discussed.
What follows is less a prescriptive guide on how to do oral history research,and is more akin
 
to a methodological case study, a qualitative confessional of sorts, that reflects upon the
 
difficulties and personal dilemmas one can face when doing fieldwork of this nature.
I will also consider how the problems facing oral history researchers do not end with the
 
fieldwork process,but may begin in earnest after the publication of their results,as infor-
mants react to how their stories have been retold. I close with an account of how positive
 
experiences can help to heal the scars of earlier trauma,even in spite of the manner in which
 
informants have re-membered past events.
Dealing with Inconsistent Evidence
 
One of the crucial issues that emerged as I tried to reconstruct through oral testimony
 
what actually happened that night in July 1945 was the inconsistent testimony surrounding
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the place and manner in which the four crewmen of the B-29 perished. Immediately following
 
the war, the surviving B-29 crewmen were debriefed by US military investigators. They
 
reported that Japanese military police interrogators and guards were quite forthright about
 
the fact that three of the four were killed on the ground,and that the fourth crewmen had
 
gone down with the plane.
By contrast, in the days of the Occupation and even up to the present, villagers have
 
maintained that all four crewmen died in the crash. Nevertheless,the villagers’story was
 
often inconsistent. In the first report,from the head of the village,a man named Meguro
 
Keiichi,all four crewmen were found dead in the aft cabin of the B-29 after the fires had died
 
down.?Meguro reported later that two men were in the front cabin and two were in the rear,
adding that a body was found hung over the gun spindle in the aft cabin of the plane.?But
 
other witnesses report two crewmen being thrown clear of the plane,while some speak of two
 
being at the crash site,one in the plane and another being brought back later.?
To understand from where such discrepancies might emerge,one must also account for
 
the“fear factor”. As indicated earlier,on the day after the crash,Captain Jordan was told
 
during his interrogation in Niigata (through an English-speaking interpreter)that two of his
 
crew had resisted capture and,as the military police interrogators put it,“couldn’t be taken
 
alive.”Another had “died gloriously”by going down with the plane.?This confirmed for
 
Jordan that interrogators spoke of the co-pilot,who had always stated to him and others in
 
the crew that,if they were shot down,he would never bail out. Later when imprisoned in
 
Tokyo,another guard who claimed to have been on rotation in Niigata approached the crew
 
and spoke of how he and a group of soldiers were shot at by a member of their crew,and then
 
how they chased him down and killed him in retaliation. The guard showed a pair of
 
lieutenant’s bars that he kept as a souvenir.?The crew surmised this guard spoke of the
 
bombardier,who also vowed that he would never let himself be taken alive if shot down over
 
Japan.
Knowledge of some or all of these incidents circulated widely among people living in the
 
vicinity of the crash,and was still remembered vividly by the wife of Meguro many years
 
later during a recorded interview with local Japanese historians.?During the final days of the
 
war, there was little fear among villagers of relating what may have happened to the
 
crewmen who had perished,especially since American flyers were placed on Imperial Japan’s
 
military version of death row for their role in the firebombings of Tokyo and other major
 
cities. Conversely,fear of what local residents would interpret as retaliation from occupation
 
forces certainly would color postwar testimony,especially if they felt that something needed
 
to be withheld in regard to the mistreatment of the downed flyers. Today,speaking about
 
the fate of the lost crewmen has been something of a taboo subject in the area,and most now
 
firmly attest to stating that all crewmen perished in the plane crash,even though some of the
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 earliest evidence suggests otherwise.
One example of this was the discovery of a set of photographs taken when Japanese
 
military police arrived at the scene. One photo showed the bound and battered bodies of the
 
two enlisted crewmen outside the plane,with one of them tied to a small sled. For crewman
 
tied to the sled (Florio Spero),he had frequently told others on the crew that if they had to
 
bail out,he would rather go out in a blaze of glory than be taken alive. A surviving crewman
 
who bailed out in the vicinity of Spero first reported to investigators that after touching down
 
he listened to Spero’s screams as he was being captured and beaten,though later for personal
 
reasons,he retracted this part of his testimony and stated that he would take the secret to the
 
grave.?In another account written by a now deceased Japanese man who participated in the
 
capture of another crewman,he reported that through his basic English skills,he learned that
 
the crewman was 22 years old. During his escort to the Kyogase Village Offices,where
 
captured crewmen were being first held,the informant writes about how the crewman was
 
set upon by villagers wielding clubs, stones and farm implements. The crewman, though
 
bleeding and injured,was delivered into military police custody.?The only member of the
 
Jordan Crew who was 22 years old at the time was Max Adams, the body of the second
 
crewman in the picture.
Discussing where the bodies were found with one of the surviving B-29 crewmen shed
 
further light on this issue:it established the impossibility of one account of anyone being able
 
to hang upon a machine gun spindle,either before or after a crash,since it is not possible to
 
make physical contact with the spindle,due to its place within the firing mechanism in the
 
Figure 2:Japanese Photo of the Bodies of Two Members of the Jordan Crew Recovered
 
Following the Downing of their B-29 (Courtesy of George McGraw/Valery Burati)
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gunnery position,which is inside the hull of the plane. Photographs in the Niigata Nippo
 
newspaper and eyewitness sketches showed this part of the plane to be only barely intact at
 
the crash site.
Nevertheless,the villagers I have spoken with have always maintained,even in the face
 
of contradictions within their story, that all four crewmen died in the crash. In Field of
 
Spears I wrote that, despite inconsistencies in their narrative, the overall story cannot be
 
discounted outright,because the last time any of the four crewmen who died were seen alive
 
was just before the crew had bailed out of the B-29. The final military investigative report
 
also reaches the same conclusion,and I highlight this fact in the book. At the same time,I
 
also suggested that it might have been possible that three of the four crewmen were killed by
 
Japanese military personnel after bailing out.In the end,with contradictory evidence and an
 
awareness of the sensitivities involved in challenging the long-held narratives of witnesses,I
 
decided to report various theories as to what might have taken place and gave scope to
 
readers to draw their own conclusions,something along the lines of Rashomon. The conclu-
sions drawn by the villagers about what I had said,with the help of an error-strewn article
 
in the Asahi Shimbun, were to jeopardize the reconciliation process that I had hoped to
 
initiate.I will return to this point later in the paper.
Counterbalancing Reconstructed Memories with the Written Record
 
Confusion is a part of battle. The first public document to come out in Japanese about
 
the downing of the B-29 over Niigata (a Niigata Nippo newspaper article on July 21,1945)
reported that two B-29s had been shot down. This was in contrast to US military reports
 
revealing that only one B-29 had been shot down in the missions of the Sixth Bombardment
 
Group stationed on the South Pacific island of Tinian.??Nevertheless,in the early days of
 
Figure 3:Japanese Photo of B-29 Crash Site(Courtesy of George McGraw/Valery Burati)
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 the occupation,US war crimes investigators devoted time to finding out how many B-29s
 
were actually lost,and Japanese historians are still asking the same questions.??
My interviews helped to piece together what likely took place. After an exhaustive
 
search, I tracked down both Japanese and American eyewitnesses, and compared their
 
accounts to declassified military documents. There were several mining missions to Niigata
 
from April 1945 up to the end of the war,but according to US records,up until July 19/20,
no B-29 was reported to have been hit by antiaircraft fire before this mission. There was a
 
low risk of another incident being confused with the Jordan crew mission. Another B-29
 
copilot on the same mission over Niigata on the night of 19/20 July confirmed that all of the
 
other planes actually returned,with damage.??This was confirmed in part by the navigator
 
of the Jordan Crew,who reported to a Japanese historian about seeing another B-29 burn-
ing,??as well as by a replacement crewman on another B-29 by the name of Robert Gelten-
bach,who reports the terror he felt when his crew dealt with an engine fire over Niigata.??
Crews were trained in strategies for facing these situations;they returned and Gelten-
bach lived to a ripe old age. Japanese eyewitnesses closer to the crash site and returning
 
crewmen both reported seeing one B-29 that broke up in the air before it finally crashed.??
The Niigata Nippo article showed pictures of the wing which had broken off and a burned-out
 
Figure 4:Grainy photo from the front page of the Niigata Nippo on July 21,1945. The white
 
streak in the upper right corner is Jordan’s plane as it burned in the nighttime sky.
The ghostly figures at the bottom are Niigata citizens in clothing designed to offer
 
protection from flak.
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engine which had crashed in a different location. The engine of the B-29 was as large as some
 
aircraft of the time. I deduced that while two B-29s had been hit,one made it back,and the
 
eyewitnesses further from the crash site had misinterpreted the separate flaming light going
 
down in the night sky as the first of two B-29s instead of what it really was― a fuel-rich B-29
 
engine burning brightly as it plummeted to the ground.
For local leaders at the time in Niigata,however,two B-29s were better than one,and
 
better for Niigata citizens’morale,which had plummeted by the end of the war. This episode
 
exemplifies the possible fallibilities in the documentary record and how oral testimony may
 
sometimes actually help to correct documentary errors.
Sanitizing the Truth
 
Informants often struggle with the image they wish to maintain of themselves. Some-
times this is at odds with their actions in war. There are regrets. An oral historian is often
 
seen as one who enters the lives of people with the intent of rummaging around in the dank
 
basement of painful personal memories. Before embarking on such a quest,oral historians
 
have to face some hard questions,especially when working with elderly people remembering
 
their most vulnerable of moments:How far does one dig ? Of what is discovered,how much
 
should be told before finding oneself either on the slippery slope to sensationalism,or on the
 
frigid coast of objectified judgmentalism?
For me,a Caucasian American who had lived in Japan for nearly twenty years,I had to
 
Figure 5:Photo of B-29 Wreckage(Niigata Nippo,July 21,1945).
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 deal with these issues while working with informants from both sides of the conflict. For
 
example,there was the case of one crewman who had died on the mission to Niigata,but
 
whose personal effects,which included a considerable amount of written material,were sent
 
to his family. Based on those records,he was idolized by his children,who had been too
 
young to know their father before he died. During my research,they were extremely helpful
 
in providing additional documents and photos,with the understanding that they wanted to
 
know as much as they could about their father. However,I began to learn how this particular
 
crewman had been at the center of a number of difficult and sometimes awkward events. For
 
example,it emerged that he had visited a bordello a few nights before they were to begin their
 
flight to Tinian,and found to his chagrin as they were on their way to Tinian that he had
 
contracted venereal disease. His need for immediate treatment stateside delayed the crew on
 
their maiden flight.Even after this incident,the crewman continued to get involved in further
 
episodes with other women at Tinian,and disciplinary problems that put him at odds with his
 
commanding officers. To further complicate matters,this crewman’s death was particularly
 
grisly and the manner in which his body was later abused by villagers was graphic. I was
 
caught between compassion for the pain I was sure to cause for one who wanted to know
 
everything about a father he had never known,and a desire to portray an unvarnished view
 
of young men at war.
Faced with this delicate situation,I turned to other crewmen in an attempt to include
 
them into the decision-making process. This did not make things easier:Some advised me
 
to be frank about human strengths and frailties,while others vented rage that their unmen-
tionable secrets had been discovered by an outsider. After some soul searching,I decided that
 
there was value in conveying the multiplicity of views expressed. At the same time, not
 
wanting to risk losing key informants for the book,I chose to mention the event concerning
 
the crew without naming names. The aim was to shed light on the crew’s humanity without
 
deconstructing anyone’s personal character.
I experienced greater difficulty during an incident involving the crew’s navigator. He
 
frequently told me during interviews of his regret about his youthful pride,and on a couple
 
of occasions,he spoke of feeling underprepared for navigating a B-29 on perilous low altitude
 
combat missions. Further reasons for his regrets became apparent when I learned from a
 
letter that he had written earlier to a Japanese historian,and which was in the Yokogoshi city
 
archives,that this navigator remorsefully mentioned that in his youthful overconfidence,he
 
had attempted to cut a few hours off their return trip,and directed the captain to take a
 
return route that took them over the middle of Niigata City on a direct course to their base
 
in Tinian.??There had been intelligence reports and mission debriefings from B-29 crews
 
back from Niigata that radar-guided searchlights and better trained anti-aircraft crews had
 
been sent to protect the port area.??However,it seems clear that the navigator was unaware
 
that his decision put their bomber in the range of the crack anti-aircraft units transferred in
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from Tokyo,who quickly shot them down.
Unfortunately,I was to learn later that the navigator had never shared this information
 
with his family and this revelation from my research was especially painful for his patriotic
 
sons,who occupied responsible positions in the military,clergy and the US federal govern-
ment. Learning of their father’s youthful error was at odds with the image they had
 
constructed over the years of their father being a war hero. As this aspect of my research
 
was crucial for understanding the reasons behind the downing of the Jordan Crew,I felt I
 
would have been remiss if I did not include it in the book,but in an effort to soften the blow
 
to the navigator’s family, I sought also to indicate the captain’s culpability in this tragic
 
incident. Interpersonal issues had resulted in the captain distancing himself from the
 
navigator. The bombardier on the crew,who was the captain’s best friend,was required by
 
regulations to learn how to navigate so that he and the navigator could work in shifts on the
 
long flights back and forth from Japan. However,the bombardier never wanted to learn how
 
to navigate,the captain never pressed the issue,thus leaving the entire burden of navigation
 
to one man. This opened the door for errors related to exhaustion. By not paying more
 
personal attention to crew training,I suggested that he was at least partly responsible for the
 
failure of their last mission. In the end,however,this did little to assuage bitter feelings,and
 
I lost contact with informants in this family as a result.
Similarly in my interviews with Japanese informants,sometimes what I learned from my
 
investigations clearly clashed with local folklore. This was apparent during an interview
 
with a small group of villagers,who at the time of the B-29 crash were young teenage boys.
They had witnessed some of the events that took place and participated in a number of
 
incidents that today remain a source of quiet shame.
The elderly men spoke in great detail about the crash and,as their stories shifted to the
 
fate of the dead crewmen,all spoke about how one had died when he had bailed out and his
 
parachute had not opened in time. Later,however,they spoke of approaching the plane in
 
the morning and of finding two bodies in the rear cabin. They were lying side-by-side in the
 
aft cabin with both their parachutes half-opened. It was obvious,the villagers said,that all
 
had died in the crash.
In most interviews,I tended to let people speak as much as possible,but before I could
 
catch myself I blurted out the obvious:“If at least one of the crewmen had died after bailing
 
out,how did he get back into the plane?”The men were stunned by the question. They had
 
mostly been talking and reminiscing among themselves,and I had been sitting there mostly
 
as a silent spectator. Now all turned their eyes to me with cold and hostile stares. The
 
silence grew heavier with each passing second. A local Japanese historian,who had set up
 
the meeting and was present during the interviews, recognized the awkwardness of the
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 moment and quickly inserted,“Oh,but he was brought back to the plane from somewhere
 
else,right?”The men looked visibly relieved:“Oh,yes,that’s right. That’s right. That’s how
 
it was. He was dead when we found him,though.”Everyone’s face was saved,local memories
 
were preserved. I ventured no more questions with this group of informants.??
In this case as in others,I decided to report the villagers’story and their reactions to my
 
question. I placed this event alongside the other features of the story that I had uncovered
 
during my research, such as reports in the archives from Japanese witnesses to severe
 
beatings of the crew from other villages further away from the crash site,and the memoirs
 
of other Japanese eyewitnesses to attacks by civilians in the grip of war hysteria.??By laying
 
out all the clues I had found,I wanted to include readers in the process of considering possible
 
implications.
Throughout the research,I had hoped to somehow serve as a bridge between both the
 
American and Japanese informants. This proved to be far more difficult than I had realized.
When I approached the elderly American B-29 crewmen,speaking to someone like me,one
 
who had lived in Japan for nearly twenty years,could not be considered as truly“American”
in a traditional sense. Visits to the United States were expensive and rare, and some
 
informants died before they felt comfortable with sitting down and speaking with me face-to-
face. Talking with American informants over the phone and communicating through letters
 
had their relative strengths and weaknesses,but my desire for interaction that was up close
 
and personal was not always satisfied.
For villagers on the outskirts of Niigata,no amount of time of me living in Japan could
 
change the fact that my face reminded them of the young men captured in the area so many
 
years ago. Japanese language issues were especially challenging,since the villagers spoke a
 
country dialect that is heard along the Agano River Valley area in Niigata Prefecture. It is
 
as difficult for a native Japanese to understand this dialect as listening to a strong Louisiana
 
bayou accent would be for an American from Minnesota. For this reason,I was careful to
 
work with competent interpreters and translators who would relate informant data to
 
standard Japanese and English in order to verify and crosscheck everything used for the
 
book.
I wanted to give this linguistic resource team greater acknowledgement in the book,but
 
because of the controversial nature of the story,they,as well as local Japanese historians,
requested anonymity. This is often the case when dealing with testimony about painful war
 
memories. Many want the message to get out to a wider audience,but are understandably
 
afraid of the personal social fallout that could result from participation in such a project. I
 
had no choice but to allow people to work with me in the manner they felt most comfortable,
though I worried about whether the use of anonymous sources would risk degrading the
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book’s credibility in the minds of skeptical readers. In a way,this did come back to haunt
 
me when difficulties arose from my interaction with elements of the Japanese media. Some
 
Japanese colleagues sought to come to my aid by proposing that, as a second language
 
speaker of Japanese,I had most likely misunderstood my informants,unaware that native
 
Japanese had helped me throughout the project. Except for being able to explain this point
 
in this journal and to Japanese residents in Niigata during times in the summer when local
 
groups typically invited me to speak about Field of Spears,I lacked a means for getting this
 
point mentioned in media sources.
In the end,I decided that a reconstruction of the last mission of the Jordan Crew required
 
the presentation of several possible scenarios. Such an acknowledgement of the inability to
 
create a definitive account is the final conclusion of many historical inquiries. The past does
 
not always reveal its secrets to those seek them;and where gaps remain between agreed
 
historical facts, there are always the“suggestions”of contemporary society on how these
 
gaps may best be filled. Herein lies the growing skepticism regarding “objective,scientific
 
history”,and the recent growth in interest in the narrative turn,postmodernism and memory
 
studies.
The Risky Nature of Oral History
 
War memories are often the source of deep-seated trauma for witnesses. The oral
 
historian therefore faces dilemmas concerning how to use informant testimony. There is a
 
difficult balance between respecting the wishes of witnesses and the researcher’s goals of
 
verifiable conclusions. This accounts for a large part of the explanation for why so much
 
published testimony of war experiences in Japan by Japanese historians and journalists draws
 
from verbatim testimony with no accompanying commentary. Witnesses are happy because
 
their personal reasons for testifying―whether therapeutic or ideological― are fulfilled.
Testimony collectors do not need to go through the risky process of verifying,assessing or
 
exposing errors in the testimony.
Oral historians use testimony to aid the construction of a narrative about the past. Our
 
interest in the pursuit of the“truth”and verifiable conclusions may not necessarily be what
 
our witnesses want. They want to be heard,to be understood,and to transmit their views of
 
the past to a wider audience. They may not wish to have their memories challenged, or
 
exposed as contradictory to other evidence. They feel their reconstructed memories in the
 
present and relive them as they remember. To question them is to deny the passion and pain
 
they feel at that very moment.
Therefore,while Field of Spears received a number of positive reviews in both scholarly
 
history journals and in the Japanese and American media for its depth of research and
 
message of reconciliation,problems arose with informants in the villages where I conducted
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 my research,especially in the hamlet of Yakeyama in Niigata prefecture,which was closest
 
to the B-29 crash site. Most notably, the book in some quarters was represented by a
 
conclusion attributed to me but which I did not make:“American soldiers were murdered by
 
villagers in Yakeyama”.
How could such a situation arise? Part of the problem lies in that Field of Spears has
 
not been translated into Japanese,with the exception of the most sensational sections in Sekai
 
magazine.??I had contacted the publishers of Sekai for a translation of the entire book. Their
 
decision,which mirrored that of others I have approached,was that a Japanese-language
 
version of Field of Spears would be unprofitable. The editors wanted the focus of the articles
 
to be upon trauma,and in an effort to meet this demand (and get published in a prestigious
 
magazine)I made the grave error of cherry picking sections of the book that I felt would
 
relate to the interests of the editorial board. That mistake on my part was compounded by
 
space limitations for magazine articles,which left me unable to go into the detail of the
 
original book and thereby outline all the complex nuances of the various hypotheses about
 
what might have happened on the night the B-29 was shot down. Consequently,later on,news
 
reporters lacking the time or language ability to read the book in English have often read
 
only the Sekai articles,extrapolated from there,and related to testifiers what they thought
 
was written in Field of Spears. Even putting aside for the moment the issue of language,
having one’s work traduced by the media is a risk that scholars may have to face. But in my
 
situation,given my errors in trying to relate a complex story back into Japanese with limits
 
on space and focus,in the minds of some Japanese readers,I had furthered the perception that
 
a foreign writer could only be critical of the Japanese. They did not know that,at least in
 
the English version,an honest attempt at a balanced and compassionate account had been
 
written.
Additional problems with Japanese media sources can be seen in an article in the Asahi
 
Shimbun on 14 August 2009,which has to the left of the main title (“‘Takeyari no mura’,
shogen no hakkutsu”, Unearthing testimony from the “Field of Spears”)was the subtitle
“Beihei satsugai”ni jimoto hanpatsu,Locals React Against “American Soldiers Murdered”.
The inverted commas around the phrase beihei satsugai could have two nuances:first,that
“American soldiers murdered”was a quotation of my conclusion, and second, that the
 
newspaper was distancing itself from that conclusion. The body of the article clearly stated
 
that the book said some of the surviving airmen were murdered by villagers(sonmin),albeit
 
contradicted a few sentences later by a sentence that more accurately,though not precisely,
conveyed what I had said in the book:there was a “possibility”that the airmen had been
 
killed by villagers.??What I had actually said was that there was a possibility the airmen
 
were killed by military personnel,specifically members of a local anti-aircraft battery. The
 
differences are extremely significant. Uniformed Japanese military personnel killing uni-
formed American aircrew who refused to surrender would be entirely legal within the laws
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of war. The word“satsugai”in the Japanese article contains the nuance of criminality and
 
suggests I had accused villagers of killing the soldier. If this were true,I would have been
 
accusing the villagers of a war crime― something that one of my closest Japanese research
 
collaborators,deeply angered at what he saw as my betrayal of Japanese village informants,
was quick to point out. Even giving the Asahi Shimbun the benefit of the doubt (and the
 
reporter who wrote the article has ignored all requests from myself to present my side of this
 
story),the fact remains that villagers in Yakeyama reacted angrily by canceling subsequent
 
meetings and cutting off contact. The message of reconciliation that I hoped would result
 
from publication of the book had been replaced by quiet recriminations.
In actuality,as mentioned above,issues of legality were less of an issue,given that some
 
of the B-29 crewmen resorted to using their. 45 automatic pistols to evade capture,but clearly
 
there was controversy over whose viewpoints and interpretations were valid. In addition,as
 
one military historian in Australia who read Field of Spears observed,regardless of having
“set out all the possibilities and evidence for what happened on that night―which is what
 
a historian has to do if he’s going to be fair―??the trouble is that the reader (or Asahi
 
journalist)then‘makes up his mind’as to which is the stronger case,and then ‘remembers’
that as the author’s‘conclusion’!”??It is perhaps inconsequential that the precise reasons for
 
the misunderstandings regarding my conclusion of there being a“possibility”(and not a firm
 
conclusion)that the airmen were killed by military personnel (not villagers)on the ground.
The fact that my account did not repeat verbatim the narrative passed down in the village
 
as the definitive account of what happened that night in itself risked evoking the anger of
 
witnesses. As a practitioner of oral history,being interviewed and seeing how my own words
 
had ended up being misused in the writings of someone allowed me to understand the pain of
 
some informants. The whole experience, therefore, while painful, became an important
 
personal lesson.
Shared Trauma
 
I found myself facing a situation where my local reputation had been tarnished and my
 
relationship with local informants had been seriously damaged,if not lost altogether. This
 
robbed me of any sense of satisfaction from the positive reviews coming from abroad.
Feeling as if I had both failed and been deeply misunderstood,in the end I decided to put Field
 
of Spears to rest. I was psychologically exhausted,and perhaps it was just best to move on.
The story would have finished there,were it not for two people:Fuyoko Nishisato,a
 
journalist attached to the German media network ZDF in Tokyo, and Susan Kae Grant,
daughter of Robert Grant of the Jordan Crew,a professor at Texas Women’s College and an
 
internationally acclaimed artist. Nishisato had for many years been involved with the Japan
 
POW Research Network,which engages in the creation of oral histories,works to uncover
 
hidden documents and refutes revisionist efforts to skew public perceptions of Japan’s
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 activities during the Second World War. Another part of this group’s mission has been to
 
invite former POWs back to Japan where they can meet their former captors,visit places of
 
past trauma and in the process,find a measure of healing and reconciliation. Grant,as the
 
daughter of a former POW,was able to see firsthand the effects of post-traumatic stress
 
disorder on her father in the years after the war. Reading Field of Spears helped her to better
 
understand what her father went through,and she was moved after witnessing the positive
 
changes in her father’s demeanor after he had opened up and shared about his ordeal in Japan.
She had her own issues to work through as well, since research does suggest secondary
 
post-traumatic stress can affect the children of former POWs.??Grant wanted to come to
 
Japan,to retrace her father’s footsteps,and if possible,to go the village where his plane had
 
gone down. Nishisato was willing to help in all aspects of the logistics necessary for getting
 
Grant and others who wished to travel with her. My participation was needed.
This invitation to help had arrived just as things had quieted down from the Asahi article.
I did not relish the thought of trying to re-approach people who believed that I had somehow
 
betrayed them. I also began to be conscious of feelings of aversion,which puzzled me. Oral
 
historians have noted that,in the process of listening to graphic accounts of torture,death and
 
rage,and through empathizing with the pain and suffering of informants,the trauma of the
 
informant can transfer to the researcher.??It becomes a shared story,and a shared trauma.
I thought that I had been objective and had somehow avoided this,but I was mistaken:
I realized that the years of working with informants,of delving deep into their stories and
 
lives,and then of losing the trust of some,had all taken a toll on me. Anticipating the stress
 
of having to re-member what had been shared to me by informants evoked waves of
 
exhaustion,and I realized that I would rather avoid the pain. “Perhaps,”I thought,“this is
 
how my informants felt when I first approached them to research Field of Spears.”
Such reflections then sparked within me a deep sense of shame:I had no right to feel
 
traumatized. The informants had experienced deep fear,hunger,and in some cases,torture,
but not I. They were the ones who truly suffered,not I. I needed to rise above my feelings
 
and reach out,just as my earlier informants had done.This was their story,not mine,and
 
what was required was that I step up to the plate,help where I could,and then get out of the
 
way.
New Hope
 
And so began the next stage of this story. During the time of preparation and of
 
reestablishing contact with area informants,pain was indeed felt,words were said, things
 
were expressed,and in the end,there was a quiet yet guarded sense of forgiveness. The door
 
was now open for Susan Grant to retrace her father’s footsteps and reach out to villagers in
 
Yakeyama in what became,for all involved,a surprising moment of peace.
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Pictures truly capture the spirit of what happened. Sixty-five years later to the day,on
 
July 20,2010,village leaders and bearers of local memories met Susan Grant at the barren
 
ground where her father’s plane went down. Everyone was tense at first, and then the
 
storytellers began to relate their memories to Grant through an interpreter. As she listened
 
intently with a mixture of respect and wonderment,everyone began to relax. Things were
 
working out.Grant’s listening attitude was having a positive effect.
Throughout the afternoon,the villagers took Grant to other places of interest. At times,
she would briefly reach out and touch the old storytellers. I observed how this had a
 
disarming,softening and almost therapeutic power. Expressions lost their intensity and the
 
tough farmers gradually became increasingly gentle and grandfatherly in their demeanor.
Near the end,many more villagers came out to greet Grant. An interesting aspect of this
 
hamlet is that most contine to keep pieces of the B-29 in hidden places,and produce them at
 
special moments. To me,it was almost as if some wanted to say through the wreckage of
 
that long-dead plane,“This is where it all changed for me. No matter how hard I want to
 
Figure 6:Photos of Yakeyama Storytellers(Left)and Susan Grant(Right)at B-29 Crash Site
 
on July 20,2010
 
Figure 7:Photos of Susan Grant(Left)and Keeper of Village Memories Tadashi Saito(Right)
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 forget,I can’t throw it away.”And yet,in the simplicity of the moment with Grant,new and
 
healing memories were added to the old. From the genuine smiles and warmth expressed
 
during that day,something good truly happened. Sometimes hope can spring forth after all.
That,I believe,is a lesson worth remembering.
Concluding Thoughts
 
In this essay,I have reviewed some of the methodological issues encountered during the
 
writing of Field of Spears, an oral history reconstruction of the downing of a B-29 over
 
Niigata. I considered challenges and issues related to the proposition of recording traumatic
 
memories, and recounted how the subsequent misrepresentation of my conclusions when
 
misreported in the Asahi Newspaper unraveled the painstaking work of building trust and
 
mutual understanding between witnesses and researcher,thereby risking the loss of a peace
 
initiative. Were it not for the determination of others who had read the book and were
 
equally invested in reconciliation,the project would have collapsed. My experiences as an
 
oral history researcher reveal not only the invaluable nature of testimony as evidence,but
 
also some of the inherent risks in oral history or testimony-based historiography,especially
 
when dealing with controversial topics.
If the research for Field of Spears has demonstrated anything,it is that testimony,even
 
if flawed and inconsistent,may be of great value,either in shedding light on the complex
 
processes by which individuals remember and reconstruct the past or in highlighting flaws in
 
the documentary record. As demonstrated by the example given earlier about the Niigata
 
Nippo newspaper article saying two B-29s were shot down,the use of testimony with careful
 
cross-referencing to all other available evidence may reveal errors in documentary sources.
Such arguments clearly undermine the claims of some positivist historians,that synthesizing
 
the documentary record carries more weight than working only with spoken discourse.
Despite such benefits of an oral history approach,publications based on testimony risk
 
Figure 8:Yakeyama Villagers Displaying Wreckage of B-29.
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affecting the memories and emotions of witnesses, perhaps even to the extent of causing
 
complete breakdown in the researcher-witness relationship. While these risks can be
 
minimized by solid communication during the article writing process,once the research is
 
published there remains the possibility of a third party entering the researcher-witness
 
relationship. The priorities of third parties are not necessarily in accordance with either
 
researcher or witness. In the case of the newspaper reportage regarding Field of Spears,for
 
example, it is not hard to see why the angle“American researcher claims villagers killed
 
downed flyers, villagers respond angrily”made a catchier headline than “American
 
researcher suggests various hypotheses about what happened,villagers reject one of those
 
hypotheses”.
Behind these problems lies the“history issue”,which at the state level merely obscures
 
the myriad of individual cases in Japan and across Asia where history remains raw, un-
resolved and contested. My dream for a reconciliation process based on this specific oral
 
history project came to a rude awakening as I faced the real world of my informants’private
 
trauma and long-standing issues. Thinking about the problems caused by my erstwhile
 
dealings with the Japanese media,and how this had compounded the pain of some informants
 
remained a nagging source of regret until Susan Grant decided to come to Japan in order to
 
meet villagers in a spirit of peace and acceptance. Even out of the scars of traumatic war
 
memories, sometimes there emerges the surprising possibility of hope. My experiences
 
illustrate that however much Japan and its former enemies can forge new relationships at the
 
level of the state,in the end,it will be up to individuals to transcend their personal experi-
ences and memories of war, and add to them new memories of peace. Despite the risks
 
involved,as both an academic and oral historian,I feel this is something well worth striving
 
for,both now and in the future.
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